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Student Conflict Assessments 
 
Students taking Environmental Conflict Resolution conduct a conflict assessment based on a student-
selected real-life environmental or natural resource conflict.  They analyze the nature, source and history 
of the conflict, identify potential stakeholders and potential issues.  If the conflict is, or has been, subject 
to a dispute resolution process, the student writes a case study identifying best practices and lessons 
learned, and gives suggestions of what could have been done differently and why (looking back).  If the 
conflict is not currently, and has not been, subject to a dispute resolution process, the student designs a 
dispute resolution process (looking forward).  Some students do a combined case study and future process 
design.   
 
Students’ papers posted on the EDR Program website include an Executive Summary.  For case studies 
(looking back), this highlights the best practices and lessons learned.  For dispute resolution process 
designs (looking forward), this provides a summary of the essential process components.  The primary 
purpose of posting these student assessments is to disseminate the “best practices” and “lessons learned” 
in each paper. 
 
Disclaimers:   
• The assessment reports reflect the student authors' opinions, and do not reflect the views or 
opinions of the University of Utah, any of its affiliated entities, or any individuals interviewed as 
part of the assessment.   
• Unlike a conflict or situation assessment conducted by a professional third party neutral, the 
students’ work does not include interviews of all stakeholder interests.  While every attempt has 
been made to include the full range of perspectives in the analysis, it is possible that some 
perspectives have been omitted. 
• The assessment reports are posted as were written by the students and therefore reflect a 
snapshot-in-time.  Facts and perspectives can change; for ongoing conflicts, the reader is 
encouraged to do additional research to confirm that the situation described in the assessment 
remains current. 
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http://www.law.utah.edu/projects/edr/ 
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The following case study relies on support from traditional research—all of which is 
cited throughout—and interviews with representatives from three of the major stakeholders 
involved in the process analyzed.  Interviews were conducted with Dianne Nielson, the former 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Environmental Quality (conducted March 15, 
2013); Marcelle Shoop, former Kennecott attorney involved in the negotiations and Kelly Payne, 
Kennecott’s Environmental Manager (conducted March 18, 2013); as well as Richard Bay, CEO 
of the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District (conducted March 25, 2013). To protect these 
individual sources and their ongoing relationships, their statements are not cited in the following 
study. 
The events analyzed in this case study began about 30 years ago, and the recollections 
and recorded information differ to some extent. Additionally, the culmination of events and 
pressures and motivations of the parties are complex, and often occurred simultaneously. 
Though the legal claims are separate, the negotiations resulted in encompassing all three 




A.  The History of the Kennecott Plume 
 
Mining began as early as 1873 around Bingham Canyon, located about 30 miles 
southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah.1 Initially, “lead, silver, zinc, and gold deposits” were found 
																																								 																				
1 Abandoned Mine Lands Case Study: Kennecott Mining Site, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, June 
26, 2006, available at http://www.epa.gov/aml/tech/kennecott.pdf (hereinafter Abandoned Mine Lands Case Study); 
GOOGLE MAPS, available at http://www.maps.google.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2013.) 
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and mined; in 1896, significant copper deposits were found.2 For over half a century, the land 
around Bingham Canyon was bought and sold by different mining companies, and was 
eventually purchased by Kennecott Utah Copper (“Kennecott”) in 1936.3  Rio Tinto acquired 
the company and its Utah holdings in 1989. 
 
The various historic mining activities left a tremendous amount of hazardous 
substances behind. “[A] 72-square mile plume of sulfate-contaminated ground water” 
resulted.4  Groundwater wells, including some drinking water wells, were compromised 
and the surrounding streams and soil were contaminated with heavy metals, including 
“cadmium, chromium, sulfate, and arsenic.”5 
In 1983, Kennecott began a hydrogeologic study to determine the condition of the 
groundwater “in a 216 square mile area” impacted by nearly a hundred years of mining.6  Utah 
state and Salt Lake County officials informally advised Kennecottn throughout the process.7 
The study results showed “significant groundwater contamination,” and in 1985, “Kennecott, the 
State of Utah, and Salt Lake County entered into a Memorandum of Agreement” formalizing the 
State and County’s health departments’ participation in the hydrogeologic study.8 The proposed 
Memorandum of Agreement contemplated the completion of the study, regular reporting, and 
the creation of a “final Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”).”9 Though Kennecott 
submitted a draft EIA, the final version required by the Memorandum was not completed 
																																								 																				
2 Abandoned Mine Lands Case Study, at 3. 
3 Abandoned Mine Lands Case Study, at 3. 
4 Sites in Reuse in Utah, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/programs/recycle/live/region8_ut/html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). Also 
known as Plume B, or the sulfate plume. 
5 Id. Also known as Plume A, or the heavy metals plume. 
6 Kennecott Corp., 801 F.Supp at 555–56 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 555–56. 
9 Id. 
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because the legal landscape changed. A year after the Memorandum of Agreement between 
Kennecott and the State of Utah, Utah filed a legal action seeking recovery based on damage to 
its groundwater resources, which was immediately stayed pending the completion of the 
hydrogeologic study.10 As discussed below, the inclusion of various stakeholders, information 
sharing, and the willingness to entertain creative solutions created an environment in which 
collaboration thrived.  
B. The Various Claims Involved at the Kennecott Site 
 
After over a century of mining and in an era of stricter environmental legislation, 
primarily the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(“CERCLA”), several legal claims arose regarding Kennecott’s holdings located around the 
Oquirrh Mountains. First, the State of Utah had a Natural Resource Damage claim under 
CERCLA against Kennecott as the owner of, and only remaining potentially responsible party 
for, the contaminated groundwater.  Second, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) had authority under CERCLA to place Kennecott’s Utah holdings on the 
National Priorities List— granting it “Superfund” status—which would give EPA “the authority 
. . . to oversee the cleanup of historical mining contaminated areas at the Kennecott 
properties.”11 Third, extensive contamination along Bingham Creek and its “historic 
floodplain” gave rise to “emergency response action under [CERCLA] to address the 
contamination.”12 These claims arose nearly simultaneously, creating a complicated context for 
negotiations between the major stakeholders. 
1. Natural Resources Damage Claim 
 
																																								 																				
10 State of Utah v. Kennecott Corp. 801 F.Supp 553, 556 (D. Utah 1992). 
11 Kennecott Copper LLC Projects, UTAH DEQ, available at http://deq.utah.gov/businesses/kennecott/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
12 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 6. 
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Under CERCLA, a state may file a Notice of Claim for Natural Resource Damages 
(“Notice”), as long as the state does so within three years of either “the date of the discovery of 
the loss and its connection with the [hazardous substance] release in question,” or the date final 
regulations are promulgated pursuant to CERCLA.13 
In order to preserve its claims under the varying statute of limitation provisions, the State 
of Utah filed a Notice for $129 million against Kennecott on July 31, 1986.14 Timing of the 
action was prescribed by CERCLA; thus, was not damaging to Kennecott and the State’s 
relationship. The State’s Division of Environmental Health informed the court that Kennecott 
should finish its hydrogeologic study and assess the contamination before any decisions were 
made.15 
After the State filed its Natural Resource Damages (“NRD”) lawsuit against Kennecott, 
the court “granted a motion to stay all proceedings so that the parties could pursue and complete 
the five year study, and later continued the stay pending settlement negotiations.”16 
2. Potential Superfund Listing 
 
While Kennecott was completing its hydrogeologic study, EPA’s inspector general recommended 
placing the Kennecott site on the National Priorities List (NPL).17  CERCLA (or “Superfund”) 
grants the federal government authority to list contaminated areas on the NPL (also known as the 
Superfund list), which in turn can impose joint and several, strict liability on those defined under 
the statute as responsible for the pollution.18 Later, EPA, Kennecott, and the State of Utah would 
																																								 																				
13 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §9607, 9612 (West 2006). 
14 801 F.Supp. at 556; Top Court Urged to Hear Kennecott Case, DESERET NEWS, July 28, 1994, 12:00 AM, 
available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/366782/TOP- COURT-URGED-TO-HEAR-KENNECOTT-
CASE.html?pg=all. 
15 801 F.Supp. at 556. 
16 Id. 
17 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 6. 
18 CERCLA Overview, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). CERCLA establishes liability for parties 
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“[reach] an agreement in principle for how the contaminated lands could best be cleaned up, [but] 
an impasse over legal and administrative terms [would lead the] EPA to move forward with the 
NPL listing” in January of 1994.19 
3. Groundwater Contamination at Bingham Creek 
 
In 1990, Utah investigators found “a strip of contamination” alongside Bingham Creek 
“and its historic floodplain”—an area which had become densely populated.20  Though 
Kennecott denied involvement in the Bingham Creek contamination, the company launched its 
own investigation, which revealed “extensive contamination....”21 Kennecott and the EPA 
resolved the contamination separately from the negotiations described below; however, it would 
be naïve to assume that it did not affect Kennecott’s choices or the relationship between 
Kennecott and the EPA, the latter of which would take Kennecott’s cleanup as a gesture of 
goodwill toward other negotiations. 
NEGOTIATIONS PART I: FORGETTING THE STAKEHOLDERS 
 
With the aid of environmental consultants from Dames & Moore, Kennecott studied the 
environmental impacts of contamination at the Kennecott site.22 Based on the information 
gathered, Kennecott proposed a settlement to the State in the summer of 1990, that included an 
“exchange of water rights valued at about [two] million dollars for the natural resource 
damage, plus... $100 million worth of remediation work.”23 The remedial work was to include 
“curtailing potential sources of groundwater pollution,” “undertaking actions to remediate the 
heavy metals plume,” “drilling very deep wells below the low pH or heavy metals plume... and 
																																								 																				
“responsible for releases of hazardous waste” and substances at abandoned or closed hazardous waste sites.  
19 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 6. 
20 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 6. 
21 Id. 
22 801 F.Supp. at 556–59. 
23 Id. 
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pumping the contaminated water down through the uncontaminated soil, attenuating the metals 
and raising the pH.”24 The settlement would have also required the State to dismiss its 
CERCLA lawsuit with prejudice.25 
At the same time, the EPA inspector general—without consultation with Utah 
officials—proposed adding the Kennecott site to the Superfund list, a proposal to which Utah 
objected.26 The State wished to use its existing permitting programs to regulate discharges 
from Kennecott, but EPA had contentions with the State’s “solid waste and hazardous waste 
[law]” mining exemptions.27 
The State rejected Kennecott’s proposal after government and outside experts convinced 
officials that “remedial action issues should be analyzed in greater detail and pursued with the 
approval of and cooperation of the EPA.”28 In February 1991, EPA, Kennecott, and Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality (UDEQ) started negotiations in an effort to create a legally 
binding consent decree.29 In July of the same year, the State and Kennecott reached a settlement 
agreement on the Natural Resource Damage claim (Consent Decree).30  
 
1. The State and Kennecott Come to Agreement on the Natural Resource Damage Claim 
 
The Natural Resource Damage Consent Decree officially established the scope of the 
environmental contamination, and required Kennecott to pay $11.7 million dollars for the 
contaminated groundwater.31 The price was “based upon an estimate of the market value of 




26 Abandoned Mine Lands Case Study, at 6. 
27 Id. 
28 801 F.Supp. at 556–59. 
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annual yield’ estimate” and other factors, such as litigation expenses.32 The State believed, 
based on the information it had seen, that the contaminated groundwater at the Kennecott site 
could not reasonably be remediated by the parties, and natural remediation, or natural 
attenuation—which would occur as contaminated water moved through the soil over hundreds 
to a thousand years—was the only feasible solution.33 
2. The Settlement is Blocked 
 
The Consent Decree was submitted in July 1991 to the U.S. District Court for the 10th 
Circuit for approval. Legal notice was published for the proposed consent decree, but the 
deadline for public comments came soon after the notice, leaving little time for interested 
parties  to submit their concerns. The Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District (District) 
determined that it did not have adequate lead-time to participate effectively through the public 
comment forum, and instead the District’s Board of Directors tried to litigate the matter. In the 
fall, after public comment was heard regarding the Consent Decree, the Court heard arguments 
from potential intervenors: the District and the Sierra Club; the State and Kennecott opposed 
the intervention in court.34 However, the court allowed the District to intervene. 
The court held a six-day evidentiary hearing in the Spring of 1992. The parties—
Kennecott and UDEQ—agreed that the site contained a 4-square mile area of heavy metals 
contamination and a 17-square mile sulfate plume.35 Kennecott and UDEQ’s Director Ken 
Alkema argued that “pumping the ground water and cleaning it would be unworkable.”36 The 
District argued the following 1) there were feasible ways to remediate at least some of the water 
																																								 																				
32 Id. at 559–60. 
33 Id. at 560. 
34 Id. at 561. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 563. 
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within the site (the District had water rights very near the established contamination site), 2) the 
area of contamination agreed upon by Kennecott and UDEQ was not appropriate because waters 
outside of the area were contaminated and no longer useable as drinking water, and 3) the 
Consent Decree failed to establish methods to mitigate future further contamination. The 
District also argued the amount of damages was incorrectly calculated, because water cannot 
simply be replaced, making a market value approach inappropriate.37 In September 1992, the 
court rejected the Consent Decree based on the objections raised by the District.38 Judge Greene 
told Kennecott, UDEQ, and the District to enter into negotiations to try to resolve their disputes. 
3. The Parties Begin Negotiating 
 
By April 1992, Kennecott, UDEQ, and the EPA had come to an “Agreement in 
Principle” for remediation of the site, which would have covered all of Kennecott’s property 
except active mining operations and provided for Kennecott to pay the cleanup costs incurred by 
EPA and UDEQ.39 The Agreement in Principle did not bar the State or EPA from pursuing 
future NRD claims.40 However, in late 1993, the parties came to an impasse and could not agree 
on the site-wide consent decree.41  Early in 1994, EPA officially took action to propose placing 
Kennecott on the NPL. 
Meanwhile, Kennecott and UDEQ continued to appeal the district court’s dismissal of 
their proposed settlement. However, their appeals were not successful: in January 1994, the 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.42 UDEQ and 
Kennecott appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied later the same year.43  
																																								 																				
37 Id. at 562–64. 
38 801 F.Supp. at 572. 
39 Id. at 559. 
40 Id. 
41 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 7. 
42 Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 14 F.3d 1489 (10th Cir. 1994). 
43 Utah v. Salt Lake Cty. Water Conservancy Dist., 513 U.S. 872, 115 S. Ct. 197 (1994) 
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Kennecott and UDEQ were out of appeals for their proposed settlement. 
Though meetings continued during the appeals process, they were largely token efforts, 
called for by EPA under its Superfund authority. EPA officials had a charge at the meeting: to 
either find a solution or get the Kennecott site listed on the NPL. This charge was the only 
substantial factor which made the meetings even partially productive by laying the groundwork 
for future negotiation. 
During this time, the public was largely unaware.  However, the District’s 
member cities were aware and requested regular progress updates. 
4. Setting the Stage for Additional Negotiations 
 
Absent a negotiated agreement, Kennecott’s only hope was to limit its liability under 
CERCLA, whether through successful litigation, or by remediating in advance of suit by federal 
or state agencies. Remediation was going to happen either way, but there was no reason to add 
litigation costs, possible treble damages, and EPA oversight costs to the bill. G. Frank Joklik, 
Kennecott’s CEO at the time, realized these multiple interests, which incentivized him to find 
creative new solutions to the contamination cleanup. As head of Salt Lake City’s Olympic bid 
committee, Joklik did not want a Superfund listing to be a disadvantage in the bidding. And as 
CEO of Kennecott, he worried such a listing would increase the cost of capital they were hoping 
to acquire to modernize its operations.44 Additionally, by maintaining control of the remediation 
process, Kennecott was able to envision wholly unheard of land reuse strategies.45 
																																								 																				
44 Id. 
45 Sites in Reuse in Utah, U.S. E.P.A., 
http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/programs/recycle/live/region8_ut.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (“The 
Kennecott Land Company has redeveloped 4,126 acres of the site into the Daybreak community.  The 
development is designed to be a model of environmentally and socially responsible growth, with all 13,600 homes 
and 9.1 million square feet of commercial building space constructed in accordance with EPA Energy Star 
efficiency guidelines.  The community also features 1,250 acres of parks, a recreational lake, pedestrian-friendly 
town centers, shops, churches, schools and mass transit.”) 
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Similarly, without a negotiated agreement, UDEQ would be forced to continue 
litigating to protect its natural groundwater resources, leaving it to choose between either 
Kennecott’s, the District’s, or develop its own position regarding the contamination, adequate 
damages, and potential for remediation. 
The District’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement was also not ideal. The District 
may have been entitled to monetary damages to purchase new water rights, but such a result 
poses its own problems... water cannot be replaced and the contamination would remain. 
Similarly, EPA would be bound by CERCLA, and forced to oversee ongoing cleanup 
operations, to standards set statutorily. 
NEGOTIATIONS PART II: A CLIMATE OF COLLABORATION 
 
Negotiations turned collaborative pretty quickly in 1994–95. Individuals who had stood 
in the way of collaborative learning and solutions left and were replaced with personalities better 
suited to the task of finding solutions outside of litigation.  Ken Alkema left UDEQ and Dianne 
Nielson was appointed as Director; Nielson was also Utah’s Trustee for Natural Resources, 
giving her authority under CERCLA her predecessor did not have. Educated in geology, Nielson 
came to the table with an interest in finding environmentally sustainable solutions that would 
please all parties.  During this time, a new corporate perspective had evolved at Kennecott.46 
Kennecott executives and those at the working level had a desire to collaborate, and 
had key interests that could not easily be fulfilled through a typical CERCLA consent decree.47 
Kennecott found that it had an interest in becoming an environmental partner, and EPA’s 
Superfund process was coming to a close.  Kennecott wanted to implement cleanup operations 
																																								 																				
46 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 6. 
47 Rio Tinto, the international company that purchased Kennecott Corp. in 1989 had an institutional focus on 
collaboration, which was seemingly trickling down to Kennecott management. 
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quicker than was necessarily feasible under the constraints of CERCLA, and focus its 
resources on those physical impacts on the environment, rather than litigation. Senior leaders at 
Kennecott were committed to negotiations and continued to try to keep the channels of 
communication open with UDEQ and the District. Kennecott continued to work on the 
physical cleanup of the impacted areas, despite the stall in negotiations. 
 
Though EPA had moved forward with the proposed NPL listing, the local community 
applied strong pressure to the agency. Kennecott’s neighbors did not want the area on the 
Superfund list, and many individuals voiced their opinions directly to EPA.  Because of the 
“staunch opposition” and the fact that Kennecott had continued, in good faith, with cleanup of its 
holdings, EPA, State of Utah and Kennecott entered into a Memorandum of Understanding in 
1995 that documented their approach going forward, including certain cleanup activities and 
delayed the NPL listing.48 EPA allowed the State to take the lead in guiding negotiations, though 
they had a representative chair the meetings, Eva Hoffman. 
The State convened the negotiations, though the location for meetings was adjusted 
based on convenience and other factors. In addition to Kennecott’s preference for collaboration, 
the political climate during the beginning of these negotiations proved to be key. Utah Governor 
Mike Leavitt (1993–2003) was actively engaged with the Western Governors Association, 
which worked to create a principled framework for approaching environmental issues, which it 
called “Enlibra.”49 The core Enlibra principles proved essential to guiding the stakeholders: 
 
1. National Standards, Neighborhood Solutions - Assign Responsibilities at the Right 
Level 
																																								 																				
48 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 6. 
49 List of Governors of Utah, WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Governors_of_Utah 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2013). 
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2. Collaboration, Not Polarization - Use Collaborative Processes to Break Down 
Barriers and Find Solutions 
3. Reward Results, Not Programs - Move to a Performance-Based System 
4. Science for Facts, Process for Priorities - Separate Subjective Choices from 
Objective Data Gathering 
5. Markets Before Mandates - Pursue Economic Incentives Whenever Appropriate 
6. Change a Heart, Change a Nation - Environmental Understanding is Crucial 
7. Recognition of Benefits and Costs - Make Sure All Decisions Affecting 
Infrastructure, Development and Environment are Fully Informed 
8. Solutions Transcend Political Boundaries - Use Appropriate Geographic 
Boundaries for Environmental Problems50 
 
The negotiation process was developed ad hoc as the stakeholders progressed, but UDEQ 
was guided by the Enlibra principles. This approach suggested the inclusion of all stakeholders in 
the process, which was attained to some level. The public’s interest in clean drinking water was 
generally represented by the District, environmental groups had a seat at the table, EPA 
continued its involvement, and UDEQ and Kennecott maintained extensive involvement in every 
step of the negotiations. 
Gaining Mutual Understanding 
Kennecott, the District, and UDEQ, with the backing of EPA, continued negotiations on 
how best to deal with the mining contamination in and around Kennecott’s property. Though the 
NPL listing remained a potential threat, negotiations became productive between 1994–95. 
Because of the complex nature of the groundwater contamination, and the various interests 
involved, a great opportunity for both collaborative learning as well as problem solving presented 
itself. The uncertainty of legal action also propelled Kennecott, UDEQ, and the District toward 
more fruitful collaborative efforts. Because none of the parties could be sure what would come of 
CERCLA claims, and because its investments in remediation and maintaining open channels of 
																																								 																				
50 Enlibra Principles Implemented at the DEQ, MICHAEL O. LEAVITT CENTER FOR POLITICS & PUBLIC 
SERVICE, available at http://leavitt.li.suu,edu/leavitt/?p=618 (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
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communication had thus far had kept Kennecott of the NPL, collaboration proved to be a safer 
bet than allowing litigation to move forward. 
Legally, Kennecott had an interest in indemnifying itself from future Superfund listings 
and liability under CERCLA. UDEQ and the District had an interest in preserving their legal 
claims until appropriate remedies were completed. The primary scientific issues focused on 
determining the amount of contamination and the possibility of remediation, both of which laid 
on a foundation of scientific uncertainty: first, because no one was sure how much water was 
affected, primarily because the affected aquifer is not uniformly shaped and its geologic history 
made an estimation complicated at best, and second, because there was a dispute as to how much 
of the sulfate plume was naturally occurring. Two basic committees were formed by the 
stakeholders: one legal and one technical.51 
1. The Technical Committee 
 
Players with differing levels of understanding of the problems involved posed a 
significant challenge to effective collaboration. To develop scientific knowledge and get UDEQ, 
Kennecott, and the District on an approximately equal level of understanding, the parties relied 
on those within the group with the most access and knowledge. Kennecott had access to a vast 
amount of scientific data, and as water rights holders, Kennecott and the District were most 
(institutionally) knowledgeable about the affected waters, including the aquifer. UDEQ and the 
District had staff with relevant expertise, and on a day-to-day basis, Kennecott worked with 
them as well as the environmental representative who was on the technical committee in an 
effort to conduct collaborative fact-finding. 
The technical committee worked to determine what information was needed for the 
																																								 																				
51 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 7. 
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parties to gain better understanding of the contamination. Because Kennecott had the greatest 
access to scientific data, their technical experts would gather the requested information and 
provide it to the entire committee. Kennecott’s monitor wells were used for further data 
collection, and the company commissioned additional wells to ascertain the extent of the 
contamination. The District supplied its own internal studies which indicated a pump and treat 
system to treat the sulfate- contaminated groundwater was  feasible. 
Experts from each stakeholder group reviewed the data to ensure it was accurate. Early 
on in the process, meetings between stakeholders were held monthly (later on meetings became 
quarterly), and all meetings were about working collaboratively. 
2. The Legal Committee 
 
Kennecott, UDEQ, and EPA’s attorneys met monthly as well. Motivated by the fact that 
Kennecott’s appeals had run out, the legal committee worked to craft an agreement outlining a 
tenable solution. Kennecott was afraid that “an over-arching consent decree would require 
unknown remedies at unknown costs.”52 The legal committee agreed that instead of one, over-
arching consent decree, UDEQ, EPA, and Kennecott would create individual consent decrees to 
address varying parts of the site.53 
COMING TO AN AGREEMENT 
 
Representatives for EPA, Kennecott, UDEQ, and the District, meeting monthly, agreed:  
 
(1) to develop standard sampling and analysis procedures to be used site wide; (2) to use 
standard remedies based on characterization results; (3) to have a committee structure 
that would bring local governments and citizens into the process; (4) to develop a site-
wide risk assessment which would be a function of land use and habitat.54 
																																								 																				
52 Id. at 9. 
53 Id. 
54 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 8.  “The progress in negotiations prompted Kennecott to continue its 
cleanup efforts and to begin new good-faith cleanup actions. This remedy strategy developed at Kennecott was later 
refined by EPA and adopted as a program called ‘presumptive remedies.’”  
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After 1994, regular public updates were held, during which a facilitator was employed, 
to inform local landowners and communities, and to receive their feedback on the progress of 
the work done by UDEQ, Kennecott, and the District.55 As the parties worked with individual 
water rights holders, community meetings were held locally for greater accessibility to those 
affected individuals. Feedback was generated and informed the negotiations regarding the 
individual consent decrees. 
1. The 1995 Memorandum of Understanding 
 
The eventual principle agreement—the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)—set the parameters for later individual consent decrees. The MOU demanded 
cleanup projects within the site could only begin and be enforced after UDEQ, Kennecott, and 
the District agreed upon remediation. As a result, EPA agreed not to proceed with the NPL 
listing. 
The technical committee established what was and was not “clean” and how certain 
types and levels of contamination were to be addressed. For instance, the committee agreed the 
sulfate-contaminated groundwater could be remediated through a pump and treat system, but 
had not yet agreed on the size of the contamination.  The MOU allowed for later individual 
Consent decrees to deal with portions of the site, as long as they fell within the parameters of the 
MOU. In this way, if new data emerged after signing the MOU, perhaps indicating a lower 
amount of water in the aquifer could be reached and remediated, the entire agreement would not 
be void; the implementation would simply focus on cleaning what could be mitigated to the 
agreed upon standard. 
2. Individual Consent Decrees 
																																								 																				
55 Information regarding how frequently these public stakeholder briefings occurred was not obtained. 
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A series of solutions were agreed upon in negotiations, and detailed in individual 
consent decrees. To date most have been implemented. To contain and prevent future pollution, 
a surface water collection system was devised and constructed, and reservoirs were triple-lined 
and updated with a “leak detection and a groundwater monitoring system.”56 In the 1995 NRD 
consent decree, a trust fund was set up by Kennecott, containing $28 million for remediation of 
Zones A and B, and $9 million for the lost use. Kennecott, UDEQ, and the District eventually 
agreed to an area of 58 square miles of sulfate-contaminated groundwater. 
Pursuant to the 2003 Joint Proposal and the adopted 2004 Joint Proposal Project 
Agreements, Kennecott and the District have been able to remediate and reuse the contaminated 
groundwater from the site. The most heavily polluted waters, those containing the heavy metals, 
are pumped and treated, and then usually reused for Kennecott’s industrial operations.57 Two 
reverse osmosis plants, for treating water contaminated with sulfate, were planned under the 
Agreement as well. Kenncott constructed the first, and the District uses the water to supply clean 
drinking water at wholesale cost to the cities of Herriman, Riverton, South Jordan, and West 
Jordan.58 The District constructed the second osmosis plant in June 2013, with partial funding 
for construction and operating costs provided by Kennecott.59 The wells that feed water to both 
plants are doing a good job of containing the expansion of the two contaminated plume areas 
and are making strides in the long-term remediation. The plants are providing high-quality 
drinking water to the affected public and are expected to provide clean drinking water for at 
																																								 																				
56 Reclaiming the environment from a century of mining: A status report on the Last Century Cleanup Program, RIO 
TINTO, Sept. 2008, at 6, available at http://www.kennecott.com/library/media/Final_Sept_Remediation_LoRes.pdf 
[hereafter Reclaiming the environment]. 
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least the next four decades.60 
Kennecott and EPA worked together to carry out extensive contamination removal from 
the Bingham Creek site.61 Kennecott provided funding for a study to determine if any adverse 
health effects had been caused by the tailings around the Creek; fortunately for residents, the 
results were very positive.62 Additionally, Kennecott undertook site-wide removal of 
contaminated soil and waste rock, placing the materials in appropriate repositories to further 
prevent the spread of harmful substances.63 The final individual consent decree for OU 2—the 
south end groundwater, approved in 2007, requires Kennecott to continue its cleanup 
operations, though the site is not slated for addition to the NPL.64 
Cleanup efforts are projected to take over 40 years and cost Kennecott $400 million.65 
But what is probably most remarkable is that through the use of collaboration and innovative 
risk taking, Kennecott was able to develop a highly profitable land reuse strategy, culminating 
in the construction of a state-of-the-art planned residential community, and opening up an 
entirely new venture for the company.66 
As a result of the creative collaborations that took place regarding the cleanup site, 
Kennecott created Kennecott Land Company.  Recognizing that the land could be of 
significant value, based on expected population growth of the Salt Lake Valley, Kennecott 
																																								 																				
60 As of May 2014, the District has completed the second reverse osmosis plant, which has successfully operated 
since June 2013.  The wells serving both reverse osmosis plants are reported to be containing expansion of the two 
contaminant plume areas and making strides in the long-term remediation.  The two plants are continually providing 
high-quality drinking water to the affected public. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 8–12. 
64 Frances Johnson, Kennecott invests $400 million in removing Utah land from proposed inclusion on EPA’s 
Superfund list, UTAH FOCUS, Feb. 2009. 
65 Second Largest U.S. Copper Producer Implements Comprehensive Clean at Bingham Canyon Mine in Utah, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, July 9, 2007; Frances Johnson, Kennecott invests $400 million in removing Utah land from 
proposed inclusion on EPA’s Superfund list, UTAH FOCUS, Feb. 2009, at 5. 
66 Historic Cleanup, KENNECOTT UTAH COPPER, 2012, available at http://kennecott.com/historic-cleanup. 
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evaluated the reuse possibilities for the site.67 
The trust that Kennecott had gained with the municipalities, whose interests were 
advocated for by the District, allowed Kennecott and the City of South Jordan to jointly plan and 
create a sustainable residential community built on reclaimed land.68 
The mixed-use community covers over 4,000 acres and includes homes, shops, 
parks, and a man-made lake. To date, there are no lingering disputes regarding the site. 
ANALYSIS/ LESSONS LEARNED 
 
The process, and its success, proved influential on the primary stakeholders. At the 
working level, UDEQ still employs the same kind of collaborative techniques utilized in the 
Kennecott negotiations.69 Similarly, Kennecott continues to use the same collaborative 
stakeholder process that developed ad hoc in its attempt to stay off the Superfund list. The 
mining company is now analyzing options for how to manage current and future waste rock 
placement through this process—evidence that negotiations and their success changed 
corporate behavior. The District, too, was convinced through its experience detailed here, that 
the stakeholder process produces better results than any other, including litigation. 
1. Stakeholder Involvement 
 
Early in the process,  stakeholders learned the importance of identifying who needs to be 
at the negotiating table and how to get them there. The primary stakeholders learned through this 
process that anyone impacted by either the problem or the solution needs to be included. When 
Kennecott and the State of Utah moved forward on the settlement for the Natural Resources 
																																								 																				
67 Abandoned Land Mines Case Study, at 11. 
68 Id. 
69 This can be evidenced by the work done with the local communities in the Monument negotiations during the 
Clinton administration, the coal bed methane extraction negotiations, the environmental negotiations that took place 
within the context of the 2002 Winter Olympics, and the investigation of contamination from animal feeding 
companies. 
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Damage claim, no one had asked the question of who else should be involved. The District, 
which would have been directly affected by the settlement, was able to block the court’s 
approval of the settlement, sending all the parties back to the drawing board. The District had 
information and knowledge regarding some 
of the affected water, and its inclusion proved useful throughout later negotiations, and 
penultimate in reaching a sustainable solution. If additional stakeholders had been included at 
the beginning, time and money could have been saved. More importantly, important 
stakeholders, like the District and local landowners, would have had great buy in and trust in 
the process, as well as in Kennecott and UDEQ, from the beginning. 
Ultimately however, because of the negotiations surrounding the claims at the 
Kennecott site, the primary players in this situation have taken the ideas of stakeholder 
involvement to heart. Kennecott still uses these processes when addressing issues of 
environmental stewardship, and the company places a strong emphasis on engaging with 
stakeholders. To ensure that the right people are at the table, Kennecott “identifies” 
stakeholders prior to starting negotiations, and then routinely reconsiders throughout the 
process; if anything changes or new stakeholders become affected, Kennecott can then engage 
them in discussions. 
2.  Institutional Attitudes Toward Collaboration 
 
The institutions involved in the Kennecott site cleanup negotiations, and their attitudes 
toward collaboration were key. Guiding principles for large institutions, such as Enlibra which 
are easy to communicate and share, are important to assure those on the working level of 
negotiations can understand the same vision and perspective as those leading the institutions. 
UDEQ’s use of collaboration and the Leavitt Administration’s promotion of the use of the 
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Enlibra principles gave UDEQ an effective institutional perspective from which to address the 
process. The Enlibra principles emphasize collaborative processes aimed at finding solutions, 
and these principles were part of every UDEQ employee’s performance plan.70 Each staff 
member working on either the technical or legal committees focused on avoiding polarization. 
Kennecott’s corporate decision to become an environmental partner and fully engage in 
the stakeholder process when dealing with environmental stewardship issues was also 
paramount. Realizing that approaching all actions through a lens of environmental stewardship 
has allowed Kennecott to become an effective environmental partner in the state. 
3.  Individual Personalities 
 
Individuals were also of upmost importance to the success of the Kennecott 
negotiations. The result of the Kennecott negotiations would likely have been vastly different 
had management failed to embrace collaboration with multiple stakeholders or if Dianne 
Nielson had not taken over UDEQ. Both individuals were open to collaborative learning and 
solutions, which allowed the negotiations, which had been largely unsuccessful to that point, to 
become effective. 
4. Objective Standards 
 
Establishing standards rather than static remediation plans also aided the progression of 
negotiations. As new information was developed or acquired, and the scope of possible 
remediation changed, new agreements did not have to be reached, drafted, and approved. 
Baseline standards were met, and although there were still disagreements about how much 
remediation may be accomplished, clean up efforts were not stalled.71 Having objective 
																																								 																				
70 Enlibra Principles Implemented at the DEQ, MICHAEL O. LEAVITT CENTER FOR POLITICS & PUBLIC 
SERVICE, available at http://leavitt.li.suu,edu/leavitt/?p=618 (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
71 Kennecott did believe that less water could feasibly be remediated than the amount represented in the 1995 NRD 
Consent Decree, but conceded an issue of groundwater recharge amounts in negotiations. 
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standards, despite changing data or interpretations, offered legitimacy to the process. 
Kennecott (and the other stakeholders) needed only to meet the standard established in the 
negotiations to satisfy the requirements of the MOU. These objective standards allowed a very 
large area of land management to be tackled methodically, and provided parameters which 
reflected the District and UDEQ’s interests, and prevented Kennecott from feeling like it was 
essentially signing a blank check. 
Additionally, objective standards represented a best practice, because there will always 
be different interpretations of data. In fact, stakeholders never reached an agreement regarding 
the way they thought the groundwater system operated. However, by creating a matrix to 
address different levels and types of contamination, negotiators were not boxed into finding a 
single consensus approach to remediation. 
5. The Importance of Fostering Relationships and Building Trust 
 
The process that unfolded took over two decades—and is continuing still—and 
processes like it, rely on trusting relationships between the parties. Over the decades, 
personnel have changed, yet stakeholders strived to maintain open communication and good 
working relationships with one another. The trust that Kennecott earned through its 
commitment to sustainable remediation allowed for a successful partnership between 
Kennecott and the City of South Jordan, which led to the creation of the Daybreak residential 
community. 
The fact that Kennecott continued its clean up efforts, even when negotiations stalled, 
garnered the company’s trust with the other stakeholders. That conduct underscored Kennecott 
as truly interested in remediation of mining-affected areas and not just in avoiding liability. 
Without that action, it is unclear whether the parties would have been able to restart negotiations 
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again in the mid-1990s, which lead to a signed Memorandum of Agreement and the 
implementation of one of the most original and remarkable CERCLA cleanups in history. 
6.  Focusing on Interests, Not Positions 
 
At one point, legal representatives on various sides became entrenched in their positions 
and progress stalled. They were essentially given a “time-out,” so that progress could continue 
and the focus on creative solutions and implementation could resume. 
This practice served the stakeholders well, by not allowing differing opinions to 
foreclose everyone from getting the best possible agreement into place. 
UDEQ’s utilization of the Enlibra principles also emphasized trust by encouraging those 
involved to “break down barriers” to find solutions, use objective data, and appreciate local 
concerns. 
 
